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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------------
DIANE E. KAPETANOV, on 
behalf of herself and 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
-v-
SMALL CLAIMS COURT OF 
OGDEN, UTAH 
Defendant-
Responden t. 
STATE OF UTAH, OFFICE OF 
RECOVERY SERVICES, 
Intervening 
Respondent. Case No . 1 81 8 2 
BRIEF OF INTERVENING RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision dated 
November 24, 1981, by Judge Ronald O. Hyde of the District 
Court of Weber county, State of Utah. Specifically, Plaintiff-
Appellant appeals the trial court's denial of a Motion for a 
Writ of Prohibition on the basis that the Small Claims Court 
is a court of appropriate jurisdiction for the determination 
of Food Stamp fraud cases. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Se,cond Judicial District Court of Weber County 
denied Plaintiff-Appellants' Petition for Writ of Prohibition 
in which she and others similarly situated have sought to 
prevent the Small Claims Court from exercising jurisdiction 
in cases in which the State of Utah, Office of Recovery 
Services, seeks to collect on food stamp overpayments where 
fraud is alleged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Intervening Respondent prays the Court uphold the 
decision of the Second Judicial District Court denying Plain-
tiff-Appellants' Writ of Prohibition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Diane Kapetanov, (hereinafter 
Plaintiff-Appellant), applied for and received food stamp 
assistance from the State of Utah during October and November, 
1979. On a review of her eligibility, November 28, 1979, she 
failed to report income from her son, though in boldface type 
the question asked "Are you, or ANYONE in your household, 
employed full or part-time? a. If yes, list their names, 
where employed and date they started work." 
The Assistance Payments Administration was notified 
by Job Service that Plaintiff-Appellant's son was employed. 
Verification proved the combined income caused the family to 
be wholly ineligible for benefits. 
-2-
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Many contacts were made with Plaintiff-Appellant 
and her attorney by the Office of Recovery Services informing 
her of the cause and amount of overpayment and seeking repay-
ment from her. When she did not make any repayment, notice 
was sent indicating legal action would be taken. 
On June 16, 1981, a letter was sent specifying that 
a judgment would be sought against Plaintiff-Appellant. A 
complaint was filed in Small Claims Court specifying the debt 
was for collection of an overpayment - unreported income. 
Said complaint was served upon Plaintiff-Appellant. She did 
not appear at the hearing and a default was entered. 
At request of Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel, the 
default was set aside and a new trial date was set. She was 
represented in the second proceeding by Utah Legal Services. 
Utah Legal Services moved that the Court dismiss the action 
for want of jurisdiction, which motion was denied. Utah Legal 
Services was given the opportunity to request a Writ of 
Prohibition from the District Court and the evidentiary matter 
was continued until after that time. 
On October 2, 1981, the matter was heard in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. On November 
24, 1981, the court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the 
Petition. From that decision, Plaintiffs-Appellants have now 
appealed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FOOD STAMP ACT SETS FORTH 
THREE ENTIRELY SEPARATE MEANS OF COLLECTION 
OF FOOD STAMP OVERPAYMENTS. 
The regulations set forth by the Department of 
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service as implementation of 
the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 CFR 270 et seq. (1981), 
establishes both a means for collection of food stamp over-
payments by the State and an obligation to do so. See 7 CFR 
273.15, 273.18 (1981). Three processes are separately set 
forth in order that persons may be afforded full due process 
when an overpayment claim is made. 
The first means of collection is an administrative 
procedure. Concern was taken to insure adequate due process 
protections would be given in such a nonjudicial setting. 
In the General Comments Section of 43 Fed. Reg. 47845, 47846, 
(1978), there is clarification of the policy for administrative 
proceedings as applied to fraud disqualification. 
"SOil'e State agencies expressed ooncem over 
the ronsti tutionali ty of administrative fraud 
hearing procedures and cited State la.vs which 
require that fraud be dete.rmined only by oourts. 
Notwithstanding State law 1 Congress has authority 
to provide an administrative procedure for dis-
qualifying individuals from Federal benefit pro-
grams who have conmitted fraud so long as the 
ronsti tutional requirements of due process are 
met. The Department carefully considered those 
due process r~uirements in establishing the 
fraud hearing standards. In addition, the tenn 
"fraud" is strictly defined in the regulations 
to protect the individual and to assure that 
the adm:i.nistrative detennination of fraud is 
applied consistently." 
-4-
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Although the matter before the Court does not 
involve disqualification (Comments Section 45 Fed. Reg. 
7208 (1980)), the concerns about administrative procedure 
are pertinent to the matter at hand. The subsequent conunents 
about fair and fraud hearing procedures elaborate upon the 
concerns about administrative procedures. 
The State, through the Office of Recovery Services, 
(hereinafter State), may also proceed civilly for collection 
through a "Court of appropriate jurisdiction", 7 CFR 273.18 (c). 
Again, procedures for civil collection are intertwined with 
those for disqualification, but in Section 273.lB(c) (2) (ii), 
administrative repayment is extensively discussed ending with 
the following: 
. A written demand letter for an unpaid 
or partially paid claim shall be sent even if 
the household has previously received a nonfraud 
demand letter because the time period covered by 
the claim and the method of rollection are 
different for fraud and nonfraud clairrs. In 
addition to the written agreeirent letter, a 
personal contact shall be made, if possible. 
THE STATE AGENCY MAY ALSO INITIATE CIVIL CDURr 
ACTION 'ID OBTAIN THE CLAIMo (emphasis not in 
original) o 
Office of Recovery Services may also prosecute food 
stamp recipients criminally for fraudulent receipt of food 
stamp benefits. Section 273.18 (c) (2) (i) states: 
The State agency shall initiate such rollection 
unless. . . the legal representative prosecuting a 
IIEITlber of the household for fraud advises , in 
writing, that oollection action will prejudice 
the case. In cases where a household rrember was 
FOUND GUILTY OF FRAUD by a oourt, the State agency 
shall request the matter of restitution be brou:rht 
before the a:>urt. (emphasis not in original) 
-5-
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The sections on disqualification which precede 
the collection section address administrative disqualification, 
and, in doing so, specify which cases are appropriate for 
civil or criminal action, to-wit: 
( d) ADMINISTAA.TIVE DISQUALIFICATION. Each 
State agency shall establish procedures for 
cnnducting fraud hearings which must confonn 
with the procedures outlined in this section. 
An administrative fraud hearing should be 
initiated by the State agency in cases in 
which the State agency has sufficient 
documentary evidence to substantiate that an 
individual has conmi tted one or rrore acts of 
fraud as defined in paragraph (b) of this 
section. Such cases may include those in 
which the State agency believes the facts of 
the individual case do not warrant civil or 
criminal prosecution through the appropriate 
court system. other cases may be those 
previously referred for prosecution but for 
which prosecution was declined by the 
appropriate legal authority. 7 CFR 273.16 (d) 
These three procedures are clearly separate in the 
regulations. Criminal and civil proceedings are clearly 
separate in the law. See Utah Code Annotated, 68-3-4 (as amended). 
Also see Gross v. U . S . , 2 2 8 F . 2 d 6 O 2 , 614 and 615 , ( 19 5 6 ) . 
Administrative rules for conduct by a department regulate that 
department and cannot regulate due process by a court. The 
administrative rules for fair and fraud hearings were adopted 
to insure only that the State did not abuse the administrative 
process and said guidelines are separate from the civil and 
criminal proceedings. A careful reading of the regulations 
demonstrates that the failure to specify that the civil and 
criminal judicial determinations were to also be subject to 
-6-
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those rules was pointedly, necessarily and intentionally 
done. The regulatory rules do not apply to the judicial 
system. 
POINT II: THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
ARE TO REGULATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS, NOT TO REGULATE JUDICIAL 
PROCEDURE. 
To support the theory of the Plaintiff-Appellants in_ 
this action, one would have to discard the separation of powers 
doctrine. Plaintiff-Appellants' entire argument is based on 
her assertion that the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court 
is governed by the same rules as those for administrative 
proceedings. 
The separation of powers doctrine established as the 
prevailing rule that there shall be a complete separation of 
powers without qualification. O'Donoghue v. U.S., 53 S Ct 740 
289 U.S. 516, 530, 77 L Ed 1356 (1933). One department should 
not act to control or embarass another. State ex rel Kostos v. 
Johnson, 69 NE2d 592, 595 (Ind 1946). Although there have been 
numerous exceptions to the rule, the intent of such a policy is 
intact. The Department of Agriculture cannot, therefore, propa-
gate rules which would govern judicial procedure. To allow such 
a policy would cause the judicial system to be at the mercy of 
the constantly changing regulations of differing administrative 
agencies. For example, the Department of Agriculture could 
require 30 days notice and another department require no more 
than 10 days. Such chaos was not the intent of the regulations 
in question. 
-7-
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The purpose of the substantial procedure set forth 
in the regulations was to insure there would not be an abuse 
of due process in the administrative system. At no point in· 
the regulations does it state that such procedures must be 
utilized in civil or criminal judicial proceedings. In fact, 
numerous times procedure is carefully enumerated for adminis-
trative proceedings and concluded with a single sentence that 
the State may also collect civilly or criminally. See 7 CFR 
273.16, 273.18(c). 
Any noncompliance with administrative regulations 
by a department does not eliminate the Court's ability to 
hear the matter, but is a matter for the court to consider 
as it determines the State's right to a judgment. Noncompli-
ance with regulations by a State could result in penalties 
by the Department of Agriculture or in the court's deter-
mination that the State does not have a valid claim for 
money judgment. The defendant in any such action could raise 
as a defense the State's failure to provide the protections 
afforded in administrative proceedings. 
Perhaps the fallacy of the Plaintiff-Appellants' 
arguments becomes most clear when applied to District Court. 
The Plaintiff-Appellants' argument would mean the District 
Court could not exercise jurisdiction in a matter if the State 
failed to comply with regulations. The District Court does 
have jurisdiction to determine money owed and even to declare 
-8-
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the rights of the parties, and failure of the State to 
comply with administrative regulations would be a consideration 
of the court in awarding a judgment, but not reason to deny 
the Court jurisdiction. The District Court, without question, 
would have jurisdiction in determinations of food stamp fraud. 
The ridiculousness of Plaintiff-Appellants' argument 
as to jurisdiction of the judicial system reaches its extreme 
in this matter. If Plaintiff-Appellants' argument were 
followed to the logical conclusion, even this Court, the 
Utah State Supreme Court, would be unable to hear this very 
matter if the State were found to have failed to comply 
with the administrative regulations. The actions of an 
administrative body would rob our Court of jurisdiction 
which would otherwise be proper. 
The intent of the term "court of appropriate 
jurisdiction" is not to regulate administratively which court 
is appropriate, but to refer to the judicial system and to 
develop an alternative to judicial action by administrative 
procedure. 
The administrative rules referred to do not govern 
judicially enforced repayments and do not apply to the case 
at hand. 
POINT III: APPELLANT WAS ACCORDED FULL 
DUE PROCESS IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT. 
The Plaintiff-Appellants have been afforded adequate 
due process protections. The United States Supreme Court has 
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stated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471, 33 L Ed 484, 92 s 
Ct 2593: 
Once it is detennined that due process 
applies, the question remains what process 
is due. It has been said so often by this 
Court and others as not to require citation 
of authority that due process is flexible 
and ~alls for such procedural protections 
as ·he particular situation demands. Con-
sideration of what procedures due process 
may require under any given set of circum-
stances must begin with a detennination of 
the precise nature of the gove.rrurent function 
involved as well as of the private interest 
that has been affected by governmental 
action... Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
Union vs. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L 
Ed2d 1230, 1236, 81SCt1743 (1961). To 
sey that the concept of due process is 
flexible does not rrean that judges are at 
large to apply it to any and all relation-
ships. Its flexLbility is in its soope 
once it has been detennined that sane 
process is due; it is a recogri.1.tion that 
not all situations calling for procedural 
safeguards call for the sarre kind of 
procedure. Supra at 481 (19.72) 
The Plaintiff-Appellant was accorded full due process rights 
in small claims court. She was personally served with a copy 
of the Affidavit stating it was for an overpayment with the 
State and further specifying it was based on unreported income. 
The Affiant in Small Claims Court must attest that he/she 
has demanded payment but that defendant refused to pay. Utah 
Code Ann., 78-6-2, (as amended). The defendant also had the 
right to present witnesses and evidence in the case. Utah Code 
Ann., 78-6-7, (as amended). 
The plaintiff in Small Claims Court, the State, had 
many contacts with both Plaintiff-Appellant and her counsel. 
-10-
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At one point, action was completely deferred for six weeks 
at request of Defendant's counsel. Several letters were 
then again sent before the case went to Small Claims. 
Plaintiff-Appellant had months of notice before judgment 
was granted and then it was set aside to allow appearance of 
counsel. 
Small Claims Court also provides for a de novo trial 
in District Court should the defendant be dissatisfied. 
Utah Code Ann., 78-6-11, (as amended). Such an appeals 
procedure insures every due process protection to the defendant. 
Additionally, the defendant in Small Claims Court 
has the opportunity to have the determination of fraud made 
by a judicial officer who is well acquainted with the statutes 
and case law pertaining to fraud. 
All of these due process rights have been afforded 
the defendant and to all members of the class in this action. 
POINT IV: THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT HAS 
JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER. 
The Small Claims Court has similar jurisdiction to 
the Circuit Court with the limitation being that jurisdiction 
is limited in Small Claims to cases for "money only" where the 
sum claimed does not exceed $400.00. Utah Code Ann., 78-6-1, 
(as amended) sets forth the creation of the Small Claims Court, 
to-wit: 
"There is hereby created in the circuit 
rourts and justice's courts of this state, 
_,,_ 
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a department to be known as the "S:MALL CIAIMS 
C'OURr" which shall have jurisdiction, but not 
exclusive, in cases for the recovery of noney 
only where the anount clailred does not exceed 
$ 400 and where the defendant resides or action 
of indebtedness was incurred within the juris-
diction of the court in which the action is to 
be maintained. Persons or rorporations may 
litigate actions on behalf of themselves in 
person or through authorized employees or 
~th.out counsel." Utah Code Ann. 78-6-1 (as 
am:mded) 
Since Small Claims Court's jurisdictional definition 
does not specify what types of cases are meant by "cases for 
the recovery of money only", one must consult the mother 
statute in which those civil actions which may be taken in 
Circuit Court are specified, to-wit: 
(1) The circuit rourt shall have civil juris-
diction: 
(a) In actions arising on contract, for 
the rerovery of noney only if the sun 
cla.i.m=d is less than $5,000, exclusive 
of rosts or court. 
(b) In actions to recover a fine, penalty, 
or forfeiture less than $5,000 given by 
statute or by ordinance of an incorporated 
city or ta.vn. 
Utah Code Ann. , 7 8-4-7 (as anended) 
The statutory definition specifies two types of cases 
--
which are for "recovery of money only". The first is for actions 
arising on contract. The second is to recovery a fine, penalty 
or forfeiture. 
This action fits jurisdictionally in both areas. 
The application Plaintiff-Appellant signed to receive benefits 
states the requirements for reporting changes in the household. 
-12-
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Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to provide such information as 
a consideration for receipt of benefits. When she failed to 
provide such information, she breached the agreement for. 
benefits. When the State filed the Small Claims affidavit, 
the State asked for "money only" , return of the money they 
expended to Plaintiff-Appellant when she was ine·ligible. 
Jurisdiction in Small Claims Court was also proper 
because the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann., 78-4-7 (as amended) , 
and Federal Government, 7 CFR 273:18, require that food stamp 
assistance received improperly must be repaid. Such statutorily 
mandated repayment would be a fine, penalty or forfeiture under 
the jurisdiction definition. 
Nothing more than money has been sought in Small 
Claims Court. Plaintiff-Appellant asserts that an order of 
disqualification could be ordered by the Court without motion 
by the State. Such a position is not supported in logic. If, 
in fact, the State chooses to proceed in Small Claims Court for 
a money judgment, they have also chosen, by virtue of the 
ju~isdictional limitations of Small Claims Court, to not have 
a judicial determination of disqualification. If disqualifi-
cation was requested, the Small Claims Court would simply deny 
the request as not being a money judgment. A declaratory 
judgment as they call it, need not be granted where there is 
an adequate remedy at law as in this case. Plaintiff-Appellants 
assert that a determination of fraud cannot be made by the 
-13-
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Small Claims Court. This issue will be fully addressed in 
the next section. 
Plaintiff-Appellant has also alleged that the Small 
Claims Court was not intended as a court of proper jurisdiction 
and cites in support, 7 CFR s 273.16(e) (2). Plaintiff-Appellants' 
brief at page 15. Plaintiff-Appellants misrepresent the 
regulations in arguing that an amount less than $400.00 is 
not a "large amount" as defined in the regulations. Although 
no reference is made to a minimum collection amount for fraud 
claims, at 7 OFR 273.18(b) (3) (A), the minimum amount for non-
fraud claims is designated as $35.00. Since all fraud claims 
must be handled as nonfraud until a determination of fraud 
is made in an administrative hearing or by a court of appro-
priate jurisdiction, it would appear that the $35.00 minimum 
would also apply to fraud claims. 7 CFR 273.18(c). 
Jurisdiction of this matter is proper in Small 
Claims Court. 
POINT V: A DETERMINATION OF FRAUD IN 
FOOD STA.MP OVERPAYMENT CASES IS NOT 
A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff-Appellants argue in their brief that the 
determination of fraud in a food stamp overpayment matter 
before Small Claims Court is a declaratory judgment. Their 
position is unfounded in law and in fact. 
For their argument Plaintiff-Appellants rely upon 
the previously cited regulations of the Department of Agri-
culture, Food Stamp Department. Those regulations do not apply 
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to regulate judicial proceedings. This point was fully set 
forth in Point II. 
Plaintiff-Appellants have misconstrued the regulations 
pertaining to fraud determinations even if the Court was to 
apply the regulations. They assert that two separate actions 
must be taken in determination of fraudulent receipt of food 
stamps. (Plaintiff-Appellants' brief at page 13}. The regulations 
do not require a bifurcated process wherein fraud is first 
determined and then judgment obtained. 
The specifications for collection after a judgment 
is obtained do not make the judgment of no affect as Plaintiff-
Appellants seem to assert. The regulations merely make require-
ments of the State before the State may utilize further powers 
of the court to enforce. Again, failure to comply with such 
regulations by the State is inapplicable to the jurisdiction 
of the court, but goes only to the State's compliance with the 
Federal regulations for State eligibility in the program. 
Plaintiff-Appellants attempt to define the fraud 
detennination as separate from the judgme_n t, making that deter-
mination a declaratory judgment, and thereby outside the juris-
diction because it is not for money only. 
A declaratory judgment is generally accepted to be: 
One which sinply declares the rights of the 
parties or e~resses the opinion of. the a:mr-t;: 
on a question of law, with.out ordering anything 
to be done. Its distinctive characteristics 
are that no executory process foll<:Ms as of 
rourse nor is it necessary that an actual wrong, 
-15-
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giv:mg rise to action for damages should 
have been done, or be imnediately threatened. 
Black' s Law Dictionary, citing Petition of 
Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A., 265, 268. 
The State is not asking for a declaration of the 
rights of the parties. The State is requesting a money 
judgment for food stamps improperly received by Plaintiff-
Appellants because of the alleged fraudulent application or 
receipt by Plaintiff-Appellants. 
A declaratory judgment is not to be made in cases 
in which an adequate remedy at law is available. Watson v. 
Washington Preferred Life Ins. Co., 81 Wash. 2d. 403, 502 P.2d 
1016, 1019 (Wash., 1972). There is an adequate remedy at law 
in the instant case. The Small Claims Court will determine 
first, if the matter is properly before the courti second1 if 
the State has met the burden of the allegations of the 
affidaviti third, if the State has a proper claim for which 
relief should be grantedi and fourth, if the amount of the 
State's claim has been adequately verified as to damages. 
Such determinations are properly before the Small Claims Court. 
Plaintiff-Appellants in arguing that a determination 
as to fraud goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Small Claims 
Court effectively eliminate the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction 
at all. If a determination of fraud was outside the scope of 
jurisdiction of the Court, many cases would also be a "declaratory 
judgment", to-wit: (1) any contract before the Small Claims 
Court wherein fraud was alleged; (2) any case in which the amount 
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of the claim was in dispute; (3) any case in which satis-
faction was a term of the contract; (4) any case in which 
damages occurred in an accident in which the defending party 
was cited to be at fault by the investigating officer; (5) any 
case in which one party paid for goods from a check without 
sufficient funds. Such actions commonly are brought to the 
Small Claims Court and were intended to be brought there. 
Such actions are not "declaratory judgments" and 
are contrary to the intent of such judgments. Plaintiff-
Appellants rely upon Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn. 
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) and the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC §2201 to support their 
argument that the determination of fraud is a declaratory 
judgment. 
It would appear that Plaintiff-Appellants have 
misrepresented the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. In 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 39 L.Ed. 2d 505, 94 S Ct 
1209 (1974) the United States Supreme Court discussed at 
length the Act and its purpose. 
To dispel these difficulties, Congress in 1934 
enacted the r:eclarato:ry Judgrren.t Act, 28 use ~§2201-
2202 (28 USCS §§2201-2202). That Congress plainly 
intended declarato:ry relief to act as an alternative 
to the strong medicine of the injunction and to be 
utilized to test the ronstitutionality of state 
criminal statutes in cases where injunctive relief 
would be unavailable is amply evidenced by the legis-
lative histo:ry of the Act, traced in full detail 
in Penez v. Ledesma, supra at 111-115, 27 L Ed 2d 
701, 91 S Ct 674 (separate opinion of Brerlnan, J.) .... 
. The Federal Declaratory Judgrrent Act was 
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intended to provide an altemati.ve to injunctions 
against state officials, except where there was 
a federal policy against federal adjudication 
of the class of li ti.gation al together. . . . 
MJreover, the Senate report's clear irrplication 
that declaratory relief would have been appropriate 
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 69 L 
Ed 1070, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468 (1925), and 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 lE 365, 
71 L Ed 303, 47 S ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 (1926), tcth 
cases involving federal adjudication of the· 
a:msti tutionali ty of a state statute carrying 
criminal penalties, and the report's quotation 
from Terrace v. Thompson, which also involved 
anticipatory federal adjudication of the 
a:>nsti tutionali ty of a state criminal statute, 
make it plain that Congress anticipated that the 
declaratory j udgrnen.t procedure would be used by 
the federal oourts to test the Constitutionality 
( 415 US 46 8) of state criminal statutes. " Id. , at 
111-112, 115, 27 L Ed 2d 701. 
Steffel, supra at 466 and 467. 
The purpose and intent of declaratory judgments is 
to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation 
of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of 
wrongs. State v. Lawson, 2 So 2d 765, 767 (Ala 1941). 
The action before this Court had already become an obligation 
of the Plaintiff-Appellants. 
The Plaintiff-Appellants argue both that executory 
process-follows as of course and that it does not. If executory 
process doBs not follow as of course and Plaintiff-Appellants 
were correct in their position that the proceeding must be 
bifurcated, then the Small Claims Court action would be in 
full compliance with the rules. 
Plaintiff-Appellants even state such to be the case 
at page 13 of Plaintiff-Appellants brief, to-wit: 
-18-
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11 
'As a general staterrent, the District Court's 
decision is correct in holding that a Small 
Clairrs Court can find that rroney is due and owing 
based on its finding that fraud was comnitted 
with.out running afoul of that Court's incapacity 
to render declaratory judgrrents. But the character 
of the relief sought must detennine the relief to 
be afforded ... 11 
The character of the relief sought was the award of 
a money judgment. As such, the Small Claims Court had juris-
diction. 
The action is not one to stablize rights. The right 
of the State to collect on food stamp overpayment cases is a 
clearly legislated right. 7 CFR 270 et seq. The State does 
not have to have rights declared when they have been legis-
latively declared. 
The action sought was not a declaratory judgment, 
but was an action for collection of money pursuant to the 
regulations and was appropriately brought in Small Claims 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Memorandum Decision of the Second Judicial 
District court should be upheld and the case be determined 
on its merits by the Small Claims Court. The Food Stamp Act 
sets forth three entirely separate means of collection for 
food stamp overpayments and in setting those regulations 
forth could not and did not intend to bar civil court juris-
diction when the regulations for administrative proceedings 
were not followed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The rules do not regulate judicial proceedings 
but merely set forth a minimum standard of due process. 
Plaintiff-Appellants have been afforded full due process in 
these matters including adequate notice. 
Small Claims Court is not making a declaratory 
judgment when it determines a claim of fraud and therefore 
· has valid jurisdiction for this action. 
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Respectfully submitted this 14th day of April_, 
K. G 
Depu Weber Count Attorney 
Attorney for Intervening 
Respondent 
First Floor, Municipal Bldg. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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